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T

he United States Supreme Court has
developed a legal doctrine — the “reserved
rights doctrine” — that allows the United
States to “reserve” water for use on federal lands,
regardless of the laws of the state where the lands
are located. Notwithstanding, the United States
Department of the Interior and the State of Colorado
recently reached an agreement under which the
United States will rely on a combination of federal
and state water rights — a “reserved” right under
federal law and a state-based right under Colorado
law — to serve the needs of a national park in
Colorado. The United States’ approach of relying
on combined federal and state rights departs from its
traditional approach, which has been to rely wholly
on federal reserved rights in using water on federal
lands. This innovative, historic approach creates
an important precedent for meeting the needs of
federal reserved lands, one that invites the states to
participate in the process; this, in turn, may signal
closer cooperation between the federal government
and the states in managing the nation’s water
resources. This paper describes the origins and
nature of the reserved rights doctrine, and how the
doctrine played a pivotal role in the recent agreement
involving the national park in Colorado.

The Reserved Rights Doctrine
The states were regarded earlier in our national
history as having exclusive authority to regulate
water, subject only to the federal power to regulate
navigation. After the American Revolution,
the King of England’s sovereignty over water
passed to the original thirteen states. The states
delegated authority in the Constitution to the
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federal government to regulate interstate commerce
— and hence to regulate navigable waters, which
were, at least at that time, a vital link to interstate
commerce. Otherwise, however, the states retained
their sovereignty over water. When new states
were admitted to statehood, they were admitted on
an “equal footing” with other states, and thus also
acquired sovereign interests in their waters (Martin
v. Waddell 1842, Shively v. Bowlby 1894).
The Supreme Court and Congress have often
recognized the states’ primacy over water. When
Congress passed land and mining laws in the latenineteenth century authorizing settlement and
mining of federal lands in the West, it provided
that the settlers’ and miners’ water rights were
governed by state laws, not national laws. In 1935,
the Supreme Court held that these land and mining
laws “severed” the water on the public lands, and
thus that the states control the use of water even
though the federal government owns the lands
(California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co. 1935). More recently, the Supreme
Court held that Congress, in passing a 1902 statute
authorizing the federal government to build projects
to reclaim the arid western lands, required that
the federal projects must comply with state water
rights laws (California v. United States 1978). As
the Court stated, Congress’ reclamation policies are
interwoven with a “consistent thread of purposeful
and continued deference to state water law …. ”
(438 U.S. at 653).
In 1908, the Supreme Court substantially
limited the states’ traditional authority to regulate
water (Winters v. United States 1908). In Winters,
Indian tribes occupying the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation in Montana began diverting water to the
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reservation to irrigate the lands. Many homesteaders
had been diverting water from the same river for
many years to irrigate their own lands, thus leaving
no water for the tribes. The United States sued
the homesteaders on behalf of the tribes, arguing
that the tribes had a superior claim to the water.
The Supreme Court agreed. The Court held that
Congress has the right to reserve water for use on
Indian reservations that have been reserved from the
public domain; this right, the Court said, is based
on the Property Clause of the Constitution, which
allows Congress to regulate federal lands. The Court
also held that Congress, in creating the Fort Belknap
Reservation, impliedly reserved water for the tribes’
irrigation needs, even though Congress had not
clearly addressed the subject when it created the
reservation. This decision established what became
known as the “Winters Doctrine.” Under this
doctrine, the United States impliedly reserves water
for use on Indian reservations when it creates the
reservations. As originally conceived, the Winters
Doctrine applied only to Indian reservations.
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded the
Winters Doctrine by applying it to all federal land
reservations, not just Indian reservations (Arizona
v. California 1963, Cappaert v. United States 1976).
The doctrine now applies for example, to national
parks, national forests, national monuments, national
wildlife refuge areas, and other federal lands. The
doctrine in its expanded form is generally known
as the “federal reserved rights doctrine.” Under
this doctrine, when Congress reserves lands from
the public domain, it impliedly reserves sufficient
water to serve the purposes for which the lands were
reserved. The amount of the reserved water is that
“necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation,
no more,” (Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138), and “without
[which] the purposes of the reservation would be
entirely defeated,” (United States v. New Mexico
1978). In Cappaert, the Supreme Court held that
the reserved rights doctrine precludes ground
water pumping that reduced water levels and thus
endangered the pupfish in Devil’s Hole, a national
monument in Nevada.
The priority of a federal reserved water right,
as against the rights of other users under state law,
is based on the date that the lands were withdrawn
from the public domain. Thus, the reserved right is
senior to private water rights acquired under state
law after the lands were reserved, and junior to water
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rights acquired before the lands were reserved. As
a practical matter, many if not most federal land
reservations supporting reserved rights occurred
relatively early in the West’s history, and thus
federal reserved rights generally are senior to most
rights acquired under state law. As the Supreme
Court has stated, “claims to water for use on federal
reservations inescapably vie with other public and
private claims for the limited quantities to be found in
the rivers and streams,” and “when … a river is fully
appropriated, federal reserved rights will frequently
require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount
of water available for water-needy state and private
appropriators” (New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705).
Recognizing these impacts on state regulation and
private rights, the Supreme Court in 1978 substantially
limited the reserved rights doctrine, at least as applied
to non-Indian lands. In United States v. New Mexico,
supra, 438 U.S. 696, the Court held that reserved
water rights apply only to “primary” reservation
purposes, not “secondary” reservation purposes. In
that case, the United States Forest Service claimed
reserved water rights for instream flows in the Rio
Mimbres in New Mexico, asserting that such instream
flows were necessary to serve the purposes of the
Gila National Forest; the specified purposes were
recreation, aesthetics, wildlife and cattle grazing,
among others. The United States claimed the reserved
rights under authority of the Forest Service’s Organic
Administration Act of 1897 and the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA) of 1960. The Supreme
Court rejected the United States’ position. The Court
ruled that Congress impliedly reserved water rights in
the Organic Act and MUSYA only for two “primary”
reservation purposes — securing favorable conditions
of water flows and furnishing a continuous supply
of timber — and that Congress did not impliedly
reserve water for “secondary” reservation uses, such
as providing instream flows for wildlife and other
purposes. The Court stated:
Where water is necessary to fulfill the very
purposes for which a federal reservation was
created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in
the face of Congress’ express deference to
state water law in other areas, that the United
States intended to reserve the necessary water.
Where water is only valuable for a secondary
use of the reservation, however, there arises
the contrary inference that Congress intended,
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consistent with its other views, that the United
States would acquire water in the same manner
as any other public or private appropriator. (438
U.S. at 702).

The Black Canyon of the Gunnison
National Park
In 1933, President Herbert Hoover issued a
proclamation creating a national monument — the
Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument
— in a stretch of the Gunnison River in Colorado.
The Black Canyon consists of steep, rocky gorges
that are among the most spectacular gorges found
anywhere in the United States. The monument’s
purposes, according to the proclamation, are “for the
preservation of the spectacular gorges and additional
features of scenic, scientific, and educational purpose.”
In 1999, Congress designated the monument as a
national park, which is known as the Black Canyon
of the Gunnison National Park (Park).
Many years after President Hoover created the
original monument, Congress created a reclamation
project — the Aspinall Unit — on a stretch of the
Gunnison River above the Park. Authorized by
Congress in 1956, the Aspinall Unit provides water
supplies for irrigation, domestic use, industrial
needs, recreation, and other uses. The Gunnison
River is a tributary of the Colorado River, which
is a major water source for several western states,
including Colorado. The Aspinall Unit is part of
a larger congressional plan — embodied in the
Colorado River Storage Project Act — to develop
Colorado’s share of Colorado River water for the
state’s future growth needs.
In creating the Aspinall Unit, Congress ordered
that construction cannot commence until the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, which is responsible for
operating the project, has examined the “economic
justification” for the project and has concluded that
“the benefits of such unit will exceed the costs.”
The Bureau of Reclamation, after reviewing the
matter, submitted its economic justification report
to Congress. The report concluded that the project
was economically justified based on the Bureau of
Reclamation’s proposed operational plan, which,
among other things, assumed a minimum annual flow
of water through the Park at the rate of 100 cubicfeet-per second (cfs). On the basis of this report, the
project was built and commenced operations.
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As the demands for Gunnison River water increased,
some water users brought an action in the Colorado
Water Court for a general stream adjudication, seeking
a declaration of the respective rights and priorities
of all water users in the river. The United States
was named as a party in the adjudication pursuant
to a federal statute, the McCarran Amendment, that
waives the United States’ sovereign immunity in
general stream adjudications.
In 1971, the United States filed a claim in the
adjudication for a reserved water right for the Park.
The Colorado Water Court assigned the United
States’ claim to a Special Master, who, after hearing
the matter, recommended that the United States’
reserved rights claim be recognized. The Colorado
Water Court agreed with the recommendation.
On appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court,
the state’s high Court in 1982 upheld the United
States’ reserved rights claim. The Court stated that
the “purpose” of the monument is to “conserve
and maintain in an unimpaired condition the
scenic, aesthetic, natural, and historic objects of
the monument, as well as the wildlife therein.”
According to the Court, these uses include “direct
flow and storage rights, transportation rights, and well
rights” for myriad purposes — such as “recreational
uses,” “domestic uses,” “agricultural and irrigation,”
among many others.
Although the Colorado Supreme Court upheld
the United States’ reserved right claim, the Court did
not quantify the United States’ right by determining
the amount of water necessary to satisfy it. Instead,
the Court remanded this issue back to the Colorado
Water Court.
Nineteen years later, on January 17, 2001, the
United States applied to the Colorado Water Court
for quantification of the Park’s reserved right.
The application requested recognition of reserved
rights for both (1) an annual “base flow” of water
and (2) annual “peak and shoulder flows.” The
“base flows” are the relatively low-volume flows
that occur more or less continuously throughout
the year, and the “peak and shoulder flows” are
the episodic, high-volume flows that occur during
spring runoff periods, and which vary from year to
year depending on the amount of rainfall. According
to the application, the Park’s reserved right would
have a priority date of November 13, 1957, which
is the date that the Aspinall Unit project acquired
its water rights
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to the application, the Park’s reserved right would
have a priority date of November 13, 1957, which
is the date that the Aspinall Unit project acquired
under state law. This means that the Park’s reserved
water right would have equal priority with the
Aspinall Unit’s water rights, and thus, according
to the application, the United States would have
“flexibility” in managing the Aspinall Unit in order
to meet the Park’s reserved rights.
The Bureau of Reclamation, which is responsible
for operating the Aspinall Unit, expressed some
concerns about the amount of the United States’
reserved right claim. The Bureau stated that the
United States’ claim would potentially allow the
Park to claim the entire amount of spring runoff
flows, which may be 12,000 cfs or even higher,
and that this would require the Bureau to allow
large quantities of Gunnison River water to pass
through the reclamation project, thus impairing the
Bureau’s ability to store the water in order to meet
its commitments to its contractors.

The Agreement Between the
Department of the Interior and
the State of Colorado
The Department of the Interior, which administers
the Park, eventually determined that the amount of
water claimed by the United States as a reserved
right for the Park was more than could be properly
justified under the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. New Mexico, in that the amounts
claimed were more than necessary to meet the Park’s
“primary” needs. The department also believed that
the Park’s needs could be met by a combination
of a federal reserved water right — reduced in
accordance with the New Mexico decision — and
a state-based water right under Colorado law.
Accordingly, the Department of the Interior and the
State of Colorado commenced negotiations for an
agreement that would allow the United States to use
water for the Park under a combined federal reserved
right and a state-based right. The parties reached
an agreement on April 2, 2003, which was finalized
by a Memorandum of Agreement signed on July 31,
2003. The agreement has two main parts.
First, the agreement provided that the Park shall
have a federal reserved water right to an annual
“base flow” of water, in the amount of 300 cfs or
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natural flow, whichever is less. This ensures that
the Park will receive a continuous, although limited,
flow of water during the entire year. This reserved
“base flow” right shall have a 1933 priority date,
which is the date that the monument was originally
created by presidential executive order. This means
that the Park’s “base flow” right shall have priority
over the Apinall Unit’s water rights, which were
acquired under Colorado law in 1957. Thus, in
times of extreme shortage, the Park’s reserved right
must be served before the Aspinall Unit’s needs
are met. Also, since the reserved right is 300 cfs
or “natural flow,” whichever is less, the Aspinall
Unit is not required to release water to satisfy
the Park’s reserved right during times of extreme
shortage, when the river flow is less than 300 cfs;
the Park is only entitled to “natural flow” under these
circumstances, which is what the Park would have
received if the Aspinall Unit had not been built.
Second, the agreement provided that the Park
shall have a water right for “peak and shoulder”
flows under Colorado law, with a priority date of
2003. As noted, these “peak and shoulder” flows are
episodic, high-volume flows resulting from spring
runoff, which may vary greatly from year to year.
Thus, the Park’s right to these high-volume flows
will depend on Colorado law, not the reserved rights
doctrine. Since this state-based right has a 2003
priority date, the right would be subordinate to the
rights of the Aspinall Unit, which were acquired in
1957, but would be senior to all rights acquired after
2003 and would include all potential future water
development both within and outside the Gunnison
River basin. Under the agreement, the United
States will submit an application for its state-based
right to the Colorado Water Conservation Board
(CWCB), which is authorized under Colorado law
to grant water right permits for “instream flows” of
water. Subsequently the United States submitted
its application to the CWCB, which granted the
“instream flow” rights.
In effect, the agreement provided that the Park
would have a combined federal and state water right —
a federal reserved right for base flows of up to 300 cfs,
and a state-based right for varying “instream” spring
peak flows. The Department of the Interior determined
that this combination of federal and state rights would
be sufficient to serve the Park’s reasonably foreseeable
future needs, based on the river’s actual hydrology
during the last twenty-six years.
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As a result of the agreement, the United States
amended its application for a quantification of its
water rights in the Colorado Water Court. The
United States withdrew its claim for a reserved right
in the amounts claimed in the original application,
in the amounts claimed in the original application,
and instead claimed a federal reserved right for base
flows of up to 300 cfs. The United States has also
filed a water right claim under Colorado law for
“instream flows.” The United States’ application
is still pending.
Some environmental organizations brought a
lawsuit against the United States, claiming that the
United States has violated federal law by reducing
the amount of its reserved rights claim, in that it
has improperly disposed of federal property and
delegated its responsibility to manage federal
property without congressional approval. This action
is also still pending. In the author’s judgment, these
challenges are unmeritorious, because the Secretary
of the Interior has broad, discretionary authority to
determine the nature of federal property claims and
has not exceeded such authority in this case.
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Conclusion
The agreement between the United States and
Colorado regarding the Black Canyon of the
Gunnison National Park has historic implications.
This may be the first time, at least in the modern
era, that the United States has agreed to acquire its
water rights for a federal land reservation under a
combination of federal and state laws, rather than
relying wholly on federal law for its rights. The
United States’ innovative approach establishes a
precedent that protects federal interests in reserved
lands, while affording respect for the states’
traditional water rights authority and for private
rights. The Black Canyon agreement, if followed
in other cases, may lead to greater cooperation
between the federal government and the states in
managing the nation’s water resources. As water
resources are subjected to growing demands caused
by burgeoning populations and conservation needs,
the intergovernmental cooperation manifested
in the Black Canyon agreement becomes more
important than ever.
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